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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The district court found reasonable suspicion to justify a drug investigation
based on the officer’s observations that Appellant Josh Poppe and his passenger
(Magdaline) were nervous and fidgety, that Josh’s hands were shaking and that he
refused to make eye contact. On appeal, the state does not defend this finding and,
instead, argues that interrogating Josh was appropriate because it did not
measurably extend the stop and was consistent with its underlying mission.
However, the officer delayed returning to the patrol vehicle to contact dispatch in
favor of confronting Josh for several minutes about his nervousness and the
presence of drugs in the vehicle. In so doing, the officer abandoned the stop’s
purpose and initiated a drug investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
This Court should therefore reverse the district court’s order denying Josh’s motion
to suppress and remand to allow Josh to withdraw his pleas of guilty.
Even if the drug dog’s alert occurred during a lawful detention, it did not
justify searching Josh for contraband. Nor did the state present evidence that Josh
would have “inevitably” been arrested for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and
paraphernalia. Instead, the record establishes that Josh probably would have been
cited and released, like his passenger, but for the cocaine’s unlawful discovery. This
Court should vacate the order withholding judgment.
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A.

The Officer’s Several Minute Interrogation Regarding Josh’s
Nervousness and Drugs Measurably Extended the Stop’s Duration
The video recording from the camera mounted on the officer’s patrol car

reveals the officer speaking with Josh and Magdaline at the vehicle’s window for a
couple minutes before directing Josh to exit while leaving Magdaline alone in her
vehicle. Exhibit A, 3:08:10 – 3:08:30. After frisking Josh, the officer confronted him
regarding his nervousness and interrogated him about drugs in the vehicle, his past
drug use and his criminal history. Id. at 3:08:30–3:10:05. Josh denied there were
drugs or other weapons in the vehicle. Id. at 3:10:05-3:10:36
Four to five minutes after stopping the vehicle, the canine handler arrived.
Exhibit A, 3:10:25. The first officer directed the canine officer to “ask [Magdaline]
out of the vehicle, and kind of get a feel for what was going on.” PH Tr. p. 11, ln,
13-16. The first officer continued to question Josh about drug use and any drugs in
the vehicle and Josh continued to deny there were drugs or other contraband in the
vehicle. Exhibit A, 3:10:25-3:11:30. The officer told Josh that “now” was his
opportunity to be honest as the officer interrogating Magdaline had a drug dog and
continued to ask whether there were drugs in the vehicle, which Josh continued to
deny. Id. at 3:11:30-3:12:20. A third officer arrived on the scene and Josh stood with
him as the first officer conferred with the canine handler. Id. at 3:12:30-3:13:22.
Finally, at about eight minutes into the stop, the officer returned to his patrol
vehicle and provided dispatch with Josh and Magdaline’s information. Exhibit A,
!2

3:13:26-3:14:38. The state cites to State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 480, 362 P.3d 551,
555 (Ct. App. 2015) for the proposition that general questioning on topics including
nervousness are permissible unless they measurably extend the stop’s duration.
Respondent’s Brief, p. 9, 11-12. In Hays, however, the Court of Appeals held that
the forty-three second discussion into the driver’s nervousness related to officer
and highway safety and did not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Such brief
questioning is certainly distinguishable from the officer’s several minute
interrogation of Josh.
It is not the subjects of the officer questions (nervousness, criminal history or
drugs in the vehicle) but their duration that are issue in this appeal. The officer’s
questioning, which resulted in a several minute delay before he contacted dispatch
to check for warrants and the validity of the Magdaline’s concealed weapon’s
permit, measurably extended the stop’s duration without reasonable suspicion.1
The state also attempts to recast Josh’s argument as one challenging that the
questioning took place outside the vehicle. Respondent’s Brief, p. 12-13. The officer’s
several minute long interaction would have measurably extended the stop’s
duration whether it took place inside or outside of the vehicle. Further, the frisk

The state questions whether Josh disputes that the officer’s “tasks” included
verifying the concealed weapons permit. Respondent’s Brief, 9 n.1. To the contrary,
Josh argues the officer unlawfully expanded the stop’s scope and duration by failing
to engage in any of these “tasks” until eight minutes into the stop when his drug
investigation was well underway and the dog sniff was imminent.
1
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and the questioning’s confrontational nature along side the freeway increased its
coerciveness and further distances the interaction from one involving a few
incidental questions unrelated to the stop’s basis.
And while an officer generally has the discretion to direct occupants to exit
during a roadside detention, the officer’s decision to do so here did not address his
stated safety concern emanating from the firearm in the vehicle. The passenger
remained unsupervised in her vehicle with the handgun easily accessible under her
seat while the officer frisked and interrogated Josh alongside the freeway.
Had the officer truly been concerned about the firearm’s presence and
whether it was lawfully possessed, he would have returned to the relative safety of
his patrol vehicle where he could ask dispatch to verify the concealed weapon’s
permit, check for warrants and conduct similar tasks while waiting for back up.
Rather, the video recording establishes the officer attempted to secure Josh’s
admission that there were drugs in the vehicle while waiting for the drug dog to
arrive.
The officer measurably extended the stop’s duration by interrogating Josh
about his nervousness and drugs for several minutes before contacting dispatch.
The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress and this Court should
vacate and remand.
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B.

No Reasonable Suspicion Justified Expanding the Detention’s Scope
As noted in the Opening Brief, it is well established that nervous demeanor

during a law enforcement encounter is of limited significance in establishing
reasonable suspicion because people are commonly nervous when confronted with
law enforcement regardless of criminal activity. See Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294,
1302 (11th Cir.2001) (general observation of nervousness, standing alone, cannot
provide “reasonable suspicion”); United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir.
1998) (it “certainly cannot be deemed unusual for a motorist to exhibit signs of
nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer”); United States v.
Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879 (10th Cir.1994) (noting that the Court had repeatedly
held that nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.1997) (nervousness is
of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion and the government's
repetitive reliance on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion must be
treated with caution).State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435, 146 P.3d 697, 701 (Ct.
App. 2006)(nervous demeanor during a law enforcement encounter is of limited
significance in establishing reasonable suspicion because people are commonly
nervous when confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity);
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285–86, 108 P.3d 424, 432–33 (Ct.App.2005) (same).
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The state contends this principle does not apply to the case at bar because
Josh “was lawfully detained pursuant to a traffic stop; he was not detained because
of general ‘nervousness.’” Respondent’s Brief, p. 9. To the contrary, while Josh was
initially detained for failing to signal a full five seconds before changing lanes, the
detention’s scope was expanded due to his nervousness. This expansion required a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and nervousness is of limited
significance in establishing such a suspicion.
According to the state, Josh’s “behavior, which included being ‘unusually
nervous and fidgety,’ having trembling hands, and refusing to make eye contact, in
conjunction with the presence of a gun in the car, was the appropriate subject of
Trooper Sproat’s questioning during a properly initiated traffic stop.” Respondent’s
Brief, p. 9. As discussed above, it is the officer’s unlawful expansion of the traffic
stop’s duration, not the topics covered by the officer’s questions, that are it issue.
Trembling hands and refusing to make eye contact are just factors related to
Josh’s nervous demeanor,2 which is typical regardless of criminal activity. That
Magdaline identified herself with a concealed weapons permit and admitted having
the handgun does not suggest criminal activity. And while the officer was certainly
entitled to verify Magdaline’s permit, questioning Josh about his nervousness while
leaving Magdaline’s alone with the gun failed to further that inquiry.

2

The officer did not suspect Josh was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
!6

The district court erred in finding that the officer possessed a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity that could justify expanding the traffic stop
into a drug investigation. This Court should therefore vacate the Order Withholding
Judgment.
C.

Actions Related to the Dog Sniff Prolonged the Detention
The officer did not further his “mission” by calling dispatch to check the

driver's license and concealed weapon’s permit and determine whether there are
outstanding warrants until several minutes after the drug dog’s arrival and eight
minutes after stopping the vehicle. The drug investigation and dog sniff
substantially prolonged the detention beyond a reasonable amount of time to
complete an investigation into the two traffic infractions.
In arguing to the contrary, the state focuses on the timing of the drug dog’s
alert, which occurred at roughly the same time as the dispatch return. Respondent’s
Brief, p. 13-14. However, the timing of dispatch’s return was orchestrated by the
officer, a member of the drug interdiction team, who had stopped a vehicle with
Washington State plates for failing to signal for a full five seconds before changing
lanes. See Tr. 12, ln. 4-21; PH Tr. p. 6, ln. 18 - p. 7, ln. 4. The officer immediately
called for a drug dog, interrogated Josh about drugs until after the drug dog arrived
and failed to contact dispatch for eight minutes. If this Court concludes that the
officer intentionally delayed contacting dispatch to ensure adequate time to
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conclude the dog sniff, its inquiry is at an end. See Hays, 159 Idaho at 482, 362 P.3d
at 557.
Nor can the officer’s several minute questioning be justified as a “negligibly
burdensome precaution” necessary to enable the officer to complete his mission
safely. See also United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2015). In Evans,
the Court found that the eight-minutes delay resulting from the officer’s decision to
conduct an additional “ex-felon registration check” was “hardly negligible.” Id. The
Court further found that the check “was inversely related to officer safety” since the
officer would have been safer had he let the defendant go once he determined there
was no reason to cite him for the traffic violations. Id.
Similarly, the officer’s several minute interrogation was hardly “negligible”
and, by leaving the passenger alone with the firearm rather than contacting
dispatch, the questioning was “inversely” related to the officer’s safety during the
stop. The officers’ questioning regarding drugs and other activities instead
facilitated the dog sniff and prolonged the stop. The district court erred in denying
the motion to suppress.
D.

Even if the Detention and Dog Sniff Were Lawful, the Cocaine’s
Discovery Cannot Be Justified as a Search Incident to a Speculative
Arrest for Misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana and Paraphernalia
The district court found that the cocaine found on Josh’s person would have

inevitably been discovered because the drug dog alert would have provided the
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officers probable cause to arrest Josh for the misdemeanors. However, the
inevitable discovery doctrine only applies if the government can establish that the
unlawfully obtained information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means by a preponderance of the evidence. Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014);
State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 788, 352 P.3d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2015).
The state presented no such evidence in this case. Instead, the state contends
that the inevitable discovery of evidence that could have theoretically supported the
arrest (small amounts of marijuana and paraphernalia for which the passenger was
cited and released) is one and the same as establishing that the arrest was
inevitable. It is not.
That is not to say that discovering evidence to justify an arrest would not
establish that such an arrest was inevitable in other situations. In Rowland, police
found methamphetamine on the defendant’s person while executing a search
warrant at his residence. While searching the residence pursuant to the warrant,
the officers discovered chainsaw parts with serial numbers corresponding to that of
the stolen chainsaw described in the warrant, controlled substances and
paraphernalia, including a digital scale. Rowland, 158 Idaho at 788, 352 P.3d at
510. The Court held that the defendant “would certainly have been arrested as a
result of the contraband found pursuant to the valid search warrant and then
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searched incident to that arrest, making the discovery of the methamphetamine in
his pocket inevitable.” Id.
Unlike the serious felonies at issue in Rowland, there is no evidence Josh
would have “certainly” been arrested for the misdemeanors. The only evidence in
the record (the passenger’s release without an arrest for the same offenses)3
supports the contrary conclusion.
Similarly, in Camou, the Court held that the government failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have applied for a warrant to search
the defendant’s phone for evidence of alien smuggling although there was arguably
probable cause to support such a warrant. The government ultimately did not
charge the defendant with alien smuggling and the prosecution had informed the
Border Patrol the case did not meet prosecution guidelines. “Because the
reasonable conclusion from the record is that no search warrant would have been
sought, the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is not satisfied.”
Camou, 773 F.3d at 944
Whether the officers would have inevitably had probable cause to charge Josh
3

The state notes that the officer testified that he released Magdaline to drive her
vehicle because it was hers. Respondent’s Brief, p. 17, n.2. This evidence does not
distinguish Josh from Magdaline or otherwise support the conclusion that Josh
would have been arrested for the misdemeanor offenses but for the cocaine’s
unlawful discovery. Indeed, there is reason to doubt the state could have presented
evidence that Josh would have been arrested for the misdemeanors. The incident
occurred in Canyon County, where it is widely known that officers cite and release
whenever possible to save very limited jail space for felony and violent offenses.
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for misdemeanor possession of marijuana and paraphernalia is not the same
question as whether he would have inevitably been arrested (and thus searched) by
a lawful means. The state presented no evidence suggesting that Josh would have
been treated differently than his passenger and would have been arrested for the
same offenses for which she was cited and released.
Contrary to the state’s argument that Josh’s argument “is predicated on his
speculation” [Respondent’s Brief, p. 16], nothing but speculation supports the state’s
contention that Josh would have inevitably been arrested instead of cited but for
the cocaine’s discovery. The state failed to meet its burden to establish that Josh
would have inevitably been arrested for the misdemeanors but for the cocaine’s
unlawful discovery. This Court should vacate the order withholding judgment and
remand to allow Josh to withdraw his guilty plea to the felony.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred in determining that the drug investigation was
supported by reasonable suspicion and that the drug dog’s sniff did not unlawfully
extend the stop. Even if the drug dog alert occurred during a lawful detention, the
search of Josh’s person cannot be upheld as a search incident to an “inevitable”
arrest. The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress and Josh
respectfully asks this Court to vacate the Order Withholding Judgment.
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Respectfully submitted this 9th day of September, 2016.
FYFFE LAW

/s/
Robyn Fyffe
Attorney for Joshua Poppe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that an electronic copy was served on
Criminal Law Division of the Idaho Attorney General at ecf@ag.idaho.gov
on September 9, 2016.

/s/
Robyn Fyffe

!12

